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Abstract
The rapid introduction of Distributed Energy
Resources (DER) into the retail/distribution
sector of the electric power system has raised
questions concerning both the economics and
control of the power system. This paper presents
one market paradigm that builds upon extension
of the logic of Locational Marginal Pricing into
the distribution level arguing that this extension is
necessary if there are to be competitive forces that
bring new technologies to market while at the
same time assuring the reliability of service. We
introduce three concepts: first that there are only
three core products (real power, reactive power
and reserves) and that all other products are
combinations of these; second that it is necessary
to calculate Distributed Locational Marginal
Prices (DLMP) in order to value any DER; and
third that for there to be a market for DER it
should be structured as an economic platform.

1. Introduction
Widespread incorporation of Distributed
Energy Resources (DER) arguably poses the most
significant challenge to the electric utility industry
since the advent of wholesale market restructuring
that began in the 1990’s. DER such as distributed
generation, distributed storage and responsive
demand, made possible because of advances in
information and communication technology, have
the potential to dramatically change the direction
of the flow of kWh on the physical assets
(substations, wires, etc.) of incumbent distribution
utilities. This change in energy flow will initially
increase rates and ultimately would prevent those
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incumbents from collecting sufficient revenue to
cover their fixed costs if policy makers do not
approve changes in the basic structure of
distribution tariffs to reflect the critical value of
the distribution assets (connectivity) in providing
reliability in supply of energy.
While the concern for the possible negative
revenue impacts of DER has gained the greatest
attention, the states of New York and California
have approached DER as a positive and
economically efficient force in the delivery of
electricity to consumers. ERCOT has developed
an innovative pricing structure and much of
Europe is struggling with the impact of DER and
more generally the advent of massive infusion of
renewable technologies into the power system.
Australia is in the midst of evaluating
economically efficient means of incorporating
DER into their energy-only market.
New York and California have proceeded
quite differently in their approach to adoption of a
pro DER position. New York has created a
proceeding within the state entitled Reforming the
Energy Vision (REV) with a focus on creating
one or more markets for the products of DER.
California has focused more on legislative and
administrative mandates in an effort to require the
distribution utilities to incorporate
greater
quantities of DER in their distribution systems.
The objective of this paper is to present one
market paradigm that builds upon the logic of
Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) suggesting
that extending the logic of marginal cost pricing /
valuing into the distribution sector is not only
feasible but necessary if there are to be
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competitive forces that bring new DER
technologies to market while at the same time
assuring the reliability of service. [1]
We introduce three critical concepts in
development of a competitive market at the retail
level and relate these to both the wholesale market
experience and to the underlying physics of the
power system. The first concept is that there are
three core products (real power, reactive power
and reserves); all other products in the market are
combinations of these three in function, space and
time. The second concept is that it is both
necessary and possible to calculate Distributed
Locational Marginal Costs (DLMPs) and that
without this ability it is not possible to accurately
value any given DER. The third concept is that
for there to be a market for DER that can be
interactive with the wholesale market there should
be an economic platform on which the DER
products can be traded. These three concepts are
developed within the paper and numeric examples
are provided of the economic value of “getting the
prices right” at the distribution level.

2. Regulatory Initiatives: Overview
The New York Public Service Commission
initiated the Reforming the Energy Vision (REV)
proceeding in April 2014. The February 26, 2015
Order in the REV proceeding states that the
general goal of REV is to move the electric
industry and ratemaking paradigm toward a
“…consumer-centered approach that harnesses
technology and markets.”[2] The Feb. 26 Order
introduces the concept of a Distributed System
Platform (DSP) provider, an entity responsible for
three major functions at the distribution level:
integrated system planning, grid operations, and
market operations. The Order assigns the role of
DSP to the state’s distribution utilities.
The
Framework Order places particular emphasis on
improving and increasing the integration of
distributed energy resources (DER) into the
planning and operation of the state’s electric
distribution systems.
It expects that better
integration will lead to “…optimal system
efficiencies, secure universal, affordable service,
and enable the development of a resilient, climatefriendly energy system.”

Juxtaposed against the platform-based
proposed market structure for New York is a more
centrally driven structure in California. The
California approach focuses on requiring
aggregators to acquire and package DER products
(e.g., real energy, reactive power, capacity) and to
offer those products in the CAISO markets. [3]
The focus in California continues to be on the
increased penetration of specific DER such as
solar and storage.

3. The Core Products
This paper distinguishes three categories of core
electric products that are central to the operation
of power systems: real energy, reactive power,
and reserves.


Real energy, measured in kWh, is the
fundamental physical electric commodity
underlying the electric products required by
utilities, ESCOs and customers. This fact is
particularly relevant to the formation of prices
for the other core electric products.



Reactive power or VAR (Volt Ampere
Reactive), measured in kVAR, sustains the
electrical field in alternating-current systems
while maintaining voltage within specific
limits required by regulation,



Reserves, measured in KW, represent the
potential to deliver real energy (kWh) at a
point in the future.

The other electric products discussed are all
derivatives of, or combinations of, these three
core products.
Reactive power and reserves are critical to the
reliable operation of distribution systems. Utilities
maintain voltage within specified limits and have
traditionally done so through the design of
distribution circuits and investments in capacitors.
Reactive power from DER represents a
supplemental if not alternative source. Significant
PV penetration can lead to violations of voltage
standards that protect customer equipment and
cause capacitors to exceed their design daily duty
cycles and quickly “wear out,” suggesting that
services for voltage control will become
increasingly valuable at locations where utilities
are integrating greater quantities of PV.
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Operating reserves from DER that can ramp their
output up and down quickly may be particularly
valuable at specific locations on distribution
systems where the Distribution Utility would
otherwise have to make a traditional infrastructure
investment. DER are widely recognize to have the
potential to provide core electric products that can
serve as alternatives to capital investments in
distribution system infrastructure and/or to
procurement of electric products from wholesale
markets. [4] PV can provide real energy and
reactive power, EV and Electric Energy Storage
can provide all three core products and DR can
provide real energy and reserves.
One of the economic factors that will affect
the quantity of each core product a specific DER
will choose to provide during any given time
interval is the fact that any unit (kW, for instance)
of a specific resource can provide only one of the
three products during that time interval, i.e., either
real energy, or reactive power or reserves. [5] As
a result, the party controlling operation of a DER
must choose which product to provide during a
given time interval. The prices of those products
not chosen represent the party’s “opportunity
cost” of not being able to use its DER to provide
those products during that time interval. Since real
energy is the dominant core product the prices for
reactive power and for reserves tend to be heavily
affected by the opportunity cost of not producing
real energy.
The contractual and operational attributes of
these core products will also affect their value
including:
 Product Location. Where the product may be
bought or sold and for which product prices
are set. It identifies the geographic granularity
of the product market. Locations may be
region-, zone- or utility-wide; at an
aggregated pricing node or trading hub; or at
a location as specific as the meter for a
customer or resource.


Product Period: The time period for which
the product may be transacted and prices are
determined. It identifies the time granularity
of the product market. For energy products,
this might be a five-minute interval. However,
forward capacity products can be traded on a

monthly, seasonal, or annual basis.


Financially Binding Forward Commitment
and Associated Financial Penalty For NonPerformance. An agreement to provide a
quantity of a specific product, in a specified
period, when specified conditions are
realized, and a dispatch signal or notice is
issued or to purchase or use a quantity of a
specific product in a specified period.
Forward commitments may be physical with
penalties for a failure to perform or financial
when the obligation may be settled financially
or covered by an offsetting transaction in a
market that clears at a future point in time.



Resource Qualifications. To make a forward
commitment to physically perform, a resource
may have to meet and maintain specified
physical, deliverability, measurement, testing,
or other qualifications. Forward commitments
also
may
require
additional
credit
qualifications.



Response or Ramp Rate (Rate of Change in
Output or Usage): Reserves (including
Frequency Response, Regulation, and
Operating Reserves) are dynamic in that the
resources are required to change their output
or usage at a specific rate commonly specified
the movement of output or demand per
second over a specified period. The required
change in output or demand may be specified
as a percentage of the called upon Reserve
quantity.

4. Distributed Locational Marginal Prices
(DLMP)
The value of electricity varies by time interval
and location within any utility distribution system.
With continuing advancements in information,
communications, and control technology, it is
feasible to extend time- and location-specific
markets to reflect these differences. Establishing
distribution level markets for DER products at
more granular pricing would accomplish this. We
argue that understanding of and ability to
calculate DLMPs is the critical step in the
economic integration of DER into the power
system and also provides the signals necessary for
efficient physical operation of the system in much
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the same manner as LMPs provide those signals at
the wholesale level.
Implementation of more granular pricing for
core electric products at the distribution level
provides the economic logic of the proposed
Platform Market. The paper acknowledges that
DLMP is only one of various possible approaches
to calculation of the value of DER. However, an
analysis of the DLMP approach is fundamental to
understanding the gains in economic efficiency
from moving the pricing point for electric product
production and consumption deeper into the
distribution system.
The mathematical structure for the calculation
of DLMP is analogous to, and needs to be
coordinated with the calculation of LMPs. DLMP
measures the locational value of real energy and
reactive power at specific nodes within the
distribution system, and therefore can measure the
value of core electric products from DER. [5,6]
The calculation of DLMP is distinct from and
more complex than that for LMP but arrives at the
same conceptual point from an economic
perspective – it defines the precise marginal value
of electric products and services at any point in
time at any location within the distribution
system.
A key point to note with respect to the
establishment of the distribution markets is the
importance of the price of real energy in the
wholesale or bulk market. The price of real
energy is the key driver of all the electric products
against which DER products are competing. The
same kW of capacity can only provide one core
product during any given time period, e.g. real
energy, reactive power, or reserves. Any given
asset can deliver a mix of core products but
cannot do so beyond the maximum capacity of the
unit. Thus, when deciding which and what mix of
core products to produce the resource owner has
to decide which product or products will yield the
greatest compensation. The price of real energy is
the most common reference point for those
decisions.

market for energy and related electric products
from DER that can animate and facilitate the
financial transactions for these DER products.
We propose a market paradigm that builds upon
the rapidly expanding development of and
academic understanding of economic platform
markets. [1]
As defined by Parker and Van Alstyne and
others:
A platform is business ecosystem that matches
producers with consumers, who transact directly
with each other using resources provided by the
ecosystem itself. The platform ecosystem provides
outside parties with easy access to useful products
or services through an infrastructure and a set of
rules designed to facilitate interactions among
users. A platform’s overarching purpose is to
consummate matches among users and to
facilitate the exchange of goods and services,
thereby enabling value creation for all
participants.[7,8,9]
A platform functions because of significant
buyers and sellers that use it for transactions of
goods and services. These participants on the
platform provide the economic incentive for the
development of third party products – network
externalities – that can exist only because of the
existence of the platform itself. Platforms like
Amazon, Uber, and AirBnB spawn these
additional applications in products and services
that range from technology to forecasting to name
but two.
The critical question for extending markets
into the distribution sector through the
establishment of platforms is how to create a
highly liquid core product market that can provide
a “level playing field” for DER, improve system
efficiency and reliability, and provide benefits to
customers. This platform paradigm considers
opportunities to:


Promote fair and open competition and reduce
barriers to the development and use of DER;



Identify, quantify, and reflect in market
design the temporal and spatial value of DER
within the larger utility system; and



Capture the economic benefits of digital

5. Platform-based market for DER
The challenge being presented by the advent
of DER is to design a new, distribution level
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platforms to support market operations, for
example as a mechanism for price discovery
and a means of integrating electric products
with digitally based services.
The design of this new market has drawn
upon the well documented and extensive
experience with electric market design at the
wholesale level. The key lesson from that
experience is the importance of “getting the prices
right.” Prices in this new market need to reflect
the value of core electric products from DER as a
function of the time at which DER produces those
products and the location at which DER produces
them. Getting the prices right – more granular –
for transactions within the distribution system
requires that price formation take place deeper in
the system. This more granular pricing will
identify where, when and how DER can provide
significant value through reduction in system
operating cost or where the ability of DER to
respond to these granular price signals can reduce
the need for additional capital investment.
Under the proposed market structure
distribution utilities would continue to provide
two services: delivery service and, where required
by the market structure, default supply service.
However, distribution utilities would specifically
be responsible for integrating DER into their
provision of delivery service in their respective
service territories and assuming that the market
structure included a shift to DLMP, they would
have a financial incentive to do so. One
component of that financial incentive would be
net revenue that distribution utilities would
receive due to the difference between charging for
losses at the marginal cost of power and their
actual cost of supplying those losses. Additional
incentives would derive from increased
transactions on the platform and from any
creative, new long term regulatory recovery
mechanisms that might be introduced.
A Platform Market for DER would combine
the benefits of a digital platform with the
economic efficiency of more granular pricing that
reflects their location- and time-specific value.
Establishing a Platform Market would create
additional value for DER owners and consumers
by:


Expanding market access for DER.
Demand Response (DR) programs typically
provide the only available paths for active DER
participation in the existing wholesale power
markets, and there are significant gaps in DER
participation in those markets. A Platform Market
would expand DER access to markets for electric
products and services by creating a new market
and by reducing the transaction costs of accessing
existing wholesale markets. The Platform Market
would enable DER to provide real energy,
reactive power, and reserves to Distribution
Utilities, default suppliers, energy service
companies (“ESCOs”), aggregators who would
bundle and market DER resources, and even
directly to other consumers. Additionally,
distribution utilities initially can use the Platform
to obtain option contracts or firm commitments
from DER, and ultimately to rely on increasingly
more granular distribution level pricing to
promote the development of DER, in quantities
and locations where DER can avoid investment in
new substations and other major distribution
investments.

Supporting new combinations of
products and services. By creating a market
with a significant number of buyers and sellers
with varying needs, and by enabling those buyers
and sellers to find and execute transactions
electronically, the Platform will support
transactions for new, innovative combinations of
products and services from DER and third parties
at low transaction cost. In addition, The Platform,
by supporting the provision of price forecasts,
data analytics, and other smart technology
services would enable price responsive flexible
demand, more efficient electric vehicle charging,
and bring to market other distributed resources to
consume or supply power when it is economical
to do so consistent given customer preferences.
(Price responsive demand is a method by which
customers, such as space conditioning in
commercial buildings and charging of electric
vehicles, can reduce their energy costs by
scheduling the flexible portion of their load
according to the forecast price of electricity in
each hour.)
A number of studies have identified the
technical potential for responsive demand to
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reduce system peak to be as much as 25%.[10]
More granular pricing could ensure that these
changes in demand and distributed supply occur
where they can provide the greatest value to the
system as a whole.

Improving
distribution
system
efficiency. Distribution Utilities traditionally
manage voltage through investments in capacitor
banks, line voltage regulators and load tap
changers located on the primary, higher voltage
elements of the distribution system. The
implementation of new technologies like smart
inverters on rooftop solar, distributed storage and
electric vehicle systems or autonomous fast-acting
distributed Var control (a current technology that
enables up to 5% or greater energy and demand
savings) may well provide a local source of Volt
VAR control at a lower cost and at higher
efficiency than traditional utility investments. [11]
Our proposed structure is comprised of a
forward (ex ante market for electric products and
a separate (ex post) clearing market, both markets
operating by and on the Platform. The forward
market provides the structure through which the
platform provider can bilaterally match location
and time-based bids and continuous price
formation can occur. Bids and offers are visible
on the Platform to all market participants but the
Platform does not identify the entities making the
bids or offers. This market is continuous in that
market participants can transact trades days
ahead, at the time of the wholesale Day Ahead
market or at any time up to the point of market
closure (production and consumption).
The
platform is the mechanism for bilateral
distribution system level transactions in the
forward market in much the same manner as other
bilateral trading markets such as ICE and
NYMEX operate for energy and other
commodities where it provides transparency for
bids and offers by product and location.
We have proposed a separate clearing market
to resolve the imbalances between scheduled
supply and actual consumption that will occur
under this market structure. Imbalances will occur
because demand forecasting is not and cannot be
perfect, and because electricity is produced and
consumed simultaneously. As a result, ex post,
the platform financially clears all positions from

the forward market. (In the wholesale market, the
ISO accomplishes this through calculation of real
time Locational Marginal Prices (LMP). In the
platform market distribution utilities will provide
to the platform the information it needs to
calculate imbalances, i.e., metered quantities of
real energy and reactive power actually consumed
and the measured flows on the system. The
Platform will run a mathematical load flow
calculation, with, in the organized markets, the
substation LMP as the reference price, to
determine a clearing price at each of the traded
distribution nodes.
This is conceptually
comparable to the real-time LMPs the ISOs
currently calculate. While the complexity of the
calculations will increase with greater levels of
granularity and the need to recognize the value of
reactive as well as real power, the logic of the
calculation is independent of the level of
granularity of the nodal system and therefore is
easily extended as the market expands.
The establishment and operation of a platform
requires a breadth and depth of participants along
with the platform sponsor and a platform
provider. The size of the potential participant
pool on both the buy and sell side is critical to the
acceptance and the success of the platform.
To further describe the operation for DER
products, appendix A provides an example of the
transactional steps in “A day in the life of the
Platform” under a DLMP Market.

6. The Benefits of DLMP over Business as
Usual and only LMP: Example
The authors have developed a quantitative
assessment of the value of moving to more
granular locational prices under a platform market
by using the DistCostMin (DCM) model, an
optimization modeling system developed by
Boston University for analysis of the economic
value of provision of and response to increasingly
granular pricing of core electricity prices in the
distribution system.[4] The DCM model was
used to compare the marginal cost of real and
reactive power supply to a simulated 800 bus
radial feeder with both commercial and residential
demand incorporating supply (solar) and storage
(electric vehicle) loads along with space
conditioning located in the Capital Region of New
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York State.
DCM considers full AC load flow constraints.
As per [12], a radial network with voltage
magnitude constraints and non-convex full AC
load flow constraints, can be seen to have a
unique optimal solution. This means that the dual
solution, i.e. the nodal prices, will be unique [6]
and applies KKT conditions to find the building
blocks that comprise the nodal prices. In
particular, DCM uses the reduced branch flow
model developed by [13] and furthered by [14]. In
most radial distribution networks, and in the one
examined here, we can verify through simulations
that the relaxation is tight. The authors would like
to point out the possible multiplicity of solutions
in the case of meshed networks with AC load
flow considerations as an interesting future
research direction.
The modeling results illustrate the criticality
of location within the distribution feeder and thus
of the relative value (positive and negative) of
energy within the system. DCM valued real
energy plus reactive power at each node, i.e., at
commercial customer meters and at residential
pole transformers, for a peak summer day and a
peak winter day for each market structure under
low and high levels of DER penetration. Figure 1
provides a graphic summary of the results of the
DLMP (dollar value) for real energy and reactive
power indicating the maximum and minimum
values that occurred at any point within the
system for each hour and the LMP nodal value
(the nearest point to the bulk power market). As
can be seen at 2pm on the test day the value of
real power ranges from a low of $0.033 to a high
of $0.112 per kWh while reactive power for the
same time period ranges from a low of zero to a
high $0.038 per kVarh.

Figure 1: DLMPs Summer Peak Day

7. Conclusion
The paper has introduced three critical concepts in
development of a competitive market at the retail
level that allows the market for DER to function
coordinated with the wholesale market and
respect the underlying physics of the power
system. The first concept is that there are three
core products (real power, reactive power and
reserves); all other products in the market are
combinations of these three in space and time.
The second concept is that it is both necessary and
possible to calculate Distributed Locational
Marginal Costs (DLMP) and that without this
ability it is not possible to value any DER. The
third concept is that for there to be a market for
DER that can be interactive with the wholesale
market there should be an economic platform on
which these product can be traded. These three
concepts are developed within the paper and
numeric examples are provided of the economic
value of “getting the prices right” at the
distribution level.
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o

o



ESCOs may aggregate the requirements and
resources of small consumers and prosumers
(generation and load response) into packages
they can then trade in standard units on the
Platform.
ESCOs will combine energy with other
potentially high-value products and services
available on the Platform to provide offers
tailored to the preferences and requirements
of specific customers, including both large
and small consumers and prosumers.
Distribution Utilities, should they also be
default suppliers, function similar to the
ESCO as a regulatory requirement. They
would be subject to regulatory oversight and
potentially performance-based incentives.



DSOs purchase distribution-reactive power
management capabilities and location specific reserves from DERs.



Distribution Utilities, as distribution system
operators, will monitor activity and forward
market liquidity in the Platform’s DLMP
markets, paying particular attention to areas in
their distribution systems that rely on DER for
service reliability, and, if needed, will
contract for and hold in reserve the output of
DER assets that may be required to address
future local constraints.





Market participants are ESCOs, Distribution
Utilities, aggregators, third-party product and
service providers, financial participants, end use customers participating on their own
account, and DERs and prosumers.
Aggregators (when and where economically
relevant) are market participants that purchase
and bundle the capabilities of smaller
customers for resale to ESCOs, default
suppliers, and NYISO.

blocks. Bids to buy and offers to sell include a
pricing provision.


The Platform will provide a continuous
matching of bids and offers (the marketmaking function) that, as part of the Platform
functionality, will include standard contract
terms and conditions (market operation rules)
for transactions, as well as the mechanisms
for market settlement.



The Platform will have, at all times, multiple
forecasts from the DSO and third parties of
locational prices. These forecasts will be
dynamic, changing as conditions change and
as the clock moves forward.

Prior to the Day Ahead wholesale (ISO) energy
market


Retail suppliers (ESCOs, Distribution Utilities
and others) will forecast their hourly needs for
the next day and, if they elect to do so, bid
into, the ISO market for supplies, as is the
case today.



Distribution Utilities providing default supply
service to customers will purchase the supply
for those customers from the ISO’s Day
Ahead Market. However, prior to making
those purchases, Distribution Utilities would
provide customers the option to accept or
modify their respective supply requirements
for the delivery day.

After the close of the Day Ahead bulk power
(ISO) energy market and before the close of each
real time (hourly1) market on the Platform


All market participants now have the
information reported by the Platform as to the
(hourly) expected value of nodal LMP, and
the value for Real Energy and reserves (as
well as any other day-ahead ancillary
services) that have cleared the day-ahead
market.



Additional bids and offers are entered onto
the Platform by market participants wanting
to create a position in the Platform’s real-time

Initial Conditions on the Platform


Because the market on the Platform will be
continuous, some market participants will
have standing positions (bids to buy, offers to
sell) for standard products for extended time
blocks, i.e., similar to the standard
transactions traded in today’s wholesale
market that focus on peak and off-peak hourly

1

“Hourly” is used only to indicate an agreed time step.
Sub-hourly time steps are equally likely.
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and reactive power obligations requirements,
operating resources, power flows, marginal
losses, and any constraints within the
distribution system (network) during each
interval (integrated over the Platform trading
period) as well as any marginal deterioration
in the lifetime of capital assets such as
transformers.

market (for instance DERs and prosumers) or
improve their market position (such as
ESCOs or Distribution Utilities).


The Platform will continuously match
bilateral bids and offers providing for
continuous price discovery.



The Platform will collect a transaction fee
from the sellers (least-elastic entity) as a
percentage of each buy/sell transaction logged
on the Platform.

At the time of closure of the Platform electric
product markets




The Platform will continue to match bids and
offers until a time certain before the close of
the time period in which the electric product
will be finally “delivered.” “Delivery” in this
context is purely financial i.e., the market
participant that has contracted to supply or
buy energy is financially obligated to supply
or consume against the terms of the standard
contract.
The Platform will settle any
imbalance between market positions for real
energy at market close and actual delivery or
consumption at interval marginal prices based
on actual distribution system topology and
power flows, as discussed below.
The Platform will collect a transaction fee as
a percentage of each buy/sell transaction
logged on the Platform.

After the closure of the Platform electric product
market


The Platform will query and receive from the
DSO a record of energy produced and
consumed by location within the distribution
system and system information needed to
calculate imbalance prices.



Based on the contracted values of the closed
market and DSO record of energy produced
and consumed (by specific location), the
market clearing function of the Platform will
calculate ex post clearing prices for energy
and reactive power by location.

o

The clearing calculation will take place as a
function of ex post actual real and reactive
energy consumed and delivered, forward real



If during the interval there are no distribution
system constraints affecting the portion of the
monitored distribution network that includes
the relevant DLMP pricing point, the interval
DLMP energy clearing price will be
calculated algorithmically, based on the
applicable ex post nodal (wholesale) DLMP
based on the distribution network power
flows for each interval.


In this case, the DLMP reactive power
clearing price for resources enrolled and
operated within the DSO’s Volt VAR
Control (VVC) program will be equal to
the resources net DLMP lost opportunity
cost from being limited in its ability to
provide Real Energy. The DSO may pay
resources participating in VVC programs
an option price that allows the utility to
call upon the resource to provide VAR
support and voltage control.



The Platform will provide all financial
clearing
information
to
market
participants. The Platform is the
bookkeeping entity of the market.
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